“The condition for the possibility of what is at hand not emerging from its conspicuousness is that the world not announce itself. And this is the constitution of the phenomenal structure of the being-in-itself of these beings.”(BT p75)

When the utility(at hand, or handiness) of something does not appear from the conspicuousness that its un-handiness reveals, then the world does not announce itself. That is to say, the world is not proclaiming itself, making a statement, or a pronouncement of itself. Its ontological state is not thematized. But this is when our phenomenological examination can best go ahead, because, Heidegger argues, then we can engage with the phenomenal structure of the being-in-itself of what we previously observed as its utility to our care.

This seems to be relevant to the methodological concept of bridling that many methods of phenomenology propose. In that case, the goal is to set aside our cares and concerns, to set aside how we thematize something to hand. By bridling (a refinement of Husserl’s concept of bracketing) we can engage on the structures that are elided by our rush to cope skillfully with whatever phenomena we engage. So if we consider a hammer, at its most extreme everything looks like a nail,and the hammer’s relationship to us is reduced to its nail-driving capabilities. Of course, the size, exact form, materials are important to its ability to drive nails. But it is easy to simply say that a hammer drives nails. But thematizing its being in such crude terms fails to address the broader range of its being.

The weight, for example, of a hammer, determines its effectiveness in a given context. A 22 oz framing hammer with drive a a 4” framing nail more easily than a 16 oz common hammer. And small brass brads will be less likely to bend beneath the blows of a smaller, 8 oz hammer. The weight of the head, the length of the handle, and the proportions will reflect the ease with which the hammer can be swung. But the action of the hammer must also account for the being swinging the hammer.

In this case, issues of strength, practice, experience, and purpose play a part in the relationship of the hammer to the hammerer. A 22oz hammer is heavy,and requires a certain amount of strength to be wielded. For example, although I am quite strong, I prefer to use a lighter hammer. This also reflects experience—after 30 years of practicing carpentry, my muscles and reflexes better let me handle a heavier hammer. But as a child, a utility hammer seemed too clumsy, too bulky, to ever control. It was only when necessity for a paycheque drove me to swing a hammer, that my strength, skill and experience as directed towards hammering began to develop.

As that experience developed, and I encountered different hammers, I began to appreciate differences in material, in weight, in balance and in handling. Some would tire me more quickly, others would allow me more consistent strikes. And this was not simply due to the hammer. These reflected me as the one wielding the hammer. Was I driving nails for fence boards or picture-framing tacks? The purpose also framed my relationship with a given tool. Heidegger describes this “noticing” as being framed by the “whole workshop as that in which taking care has always already been dwelling”.(BT p74)

This sense of dwelling, of being part of, is created by the references that surround us(BT p74) Those references become unavailable when a object ceases to be handy. We notice a conspicuous difficulty, and we cease our hammering, or else obstinately continue, noticing that each swing fails our purpose, missing the nail, bending it, failing to drive it, perhaps injuring our hand or arm. We become aware that more is going on than the simple driving of a nail. That phenomenal experience disappears with the ease with which it happens. But now, we become aware of the object’s being-in-the-world. But that is not to say, that we can immediately discern that being. It becomes conspicuous because it is more than just the tool I use to drive nails.

Why can’t I drive these nails? is it the weight or shape? Is it the appropriateness to the job, or to my abilities? Has the hammer developed a fault that I am only aware of due to my failure to drive nails? It is at this point I begin to ask questions about the hammer, the work and myself.

Prior to the necessity of questions, I could use the hammer with actions and without words. My engagement with the worldliness of the hammer was simpler, and didn’t require conceptual structures to use it. Certainly, discussions with clients as to what required nailing, where and why reflected strategic conversations. But to take up the hammer requires the action, and if the nails were driven in with ease, then words were not necessary. Hubert Dreyfus illustrates this in his lectures about Merleau-Ponty and The Phenomenology of Perception. At one point he describes how Greek warriors’ arms pulled the food to themselves. “The Hungry warriors sat down and their arms went out to the food.” There is not a representational model, nor a philosophical zombie here. The sailors act because they can, and because of the tension of hunger and fatigue. Conceptualizing occurs after the fact.

It is here that I am pausing to reflect on a difference between visualization and representation. One is an action that we undertake similar to hammering a nail. Our imagination occurs and we picture something. Then by another action we might render it to paper. Here it may become obstinate, or conspicuous, as we attempt to cope with visualizing an object, event or action that may only exist in our imagination. Representation, on the other hand, seems like a second-hand action. We create a representation in the mind and that guides our action. But this is not visualization as imagination; representation is one way that we conceptualize phenomenal consciousness. If this were true, it seems to me it overly complexifies actions like hammering, which seem to happen through the body, and would make imagination a second hand form of representation, which seems both conceptually redundant, and fundamentally a mis-characterization of visualization. Moreover, visualization as preparation for successful performance of actions, as in sports, seems different from representation as an element of phenomenal consciousness, as described by some philosophers and neuroscientists. In those cases, the mental process of visualization is deliberate, guided, and ceases once the activity has begun.

One can imagine Homeric warriors trudging towards the table, imagining the foods they wished to enjoy. They might visualize the foods, the smells wafting from the canteen calling to them. But one they sat down, imagination yields to eating, and they did not have to imagine themselves eating, to grasp the food, and consume it. So too, the carpenter may imagine the drawings that guide them, or visualize the structure. They may pause to consider a difficulty that emerges from the work. But the actions that occur through the body simply happen. And at that point the the world does not announce itself, because the hammerer or the eater is dwelling in it without need for propositions to engage with it.

-AvS

N.B lightly edited in Aug 2020 for typos and clarity.

References:

Dreyfus, Hubert, recorded lecture “The Phenomenology of Perception” 2005 downloaded from Youtube.

Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, Joan Stambaugh, tr. 2010